The word reaction: from physics to psychiatry by Starobinski, Jean & Serafini-Sauli, Judith P.
Psychological Medicine, 1977, 7, 373-386
Printed in Great Britain
The word reaction: from physics to psychiatry
JEAN STAROBINSKI1
(Translated by Judith P. Serafini-Sauli)
The editor is grateful for permission to reprint this article,
which was first published in Diogenes, no. 93, Spring 1976.
A LATE WORD
Reagere, reactio does not belong to classical
Latin.2 None the less, antiquity was not unaware
of the concept of reciprocal action, where the
'patient' reacts in return on the agent.3 The
Aristotelian doctrine of antiperistasis occupied
physicists up until the time of Galileo: 'All
movers, as long as they move, are at the same
time moved.'4 The Latin medieval authors dis-
pense with reagere and reactio. It is the vetbpati,
designating the passive state to which the prefix
re is added in the aphorism attributed to the
Scholastics in the eighteenth-century dictionaries:
omnis agens agendo repatitur.h In their concern
for good Latin, the writers of the Renaissance
made an effort to avoid the words reagere and
reactio. Vossius allows them a little disdainfully
in the study programme of philosophers (in
scholis philosophorum) for it is a term proper to
the object designated by the two words (vox
idonea rei quern signant). But in all other cir-
cumstances he prefers expressions such as
vicissim agere, resistere agenti in se.6
In the philosophical language of the Renais-
sance, despite the opposition offered by the
purists, the term is introduced and becomes
widespread. Pomponazzi has written a De
1
 Address for correspondence: Professor Jean Staro-
bi'nski, 12 Rue de Candolle, Geneva, Switzerland.
• The term is absent in Souter (1949), A Glossary of Later
Latin. It is also absent in Blaise (1954), Dictionnaire latin-
francais des auteurs chritiens.
• Sir Thomas Heath finds an anticipation of the Newtonian
law of the equality of action and reaction even in Aristotle's
De Motu Animalium (c. i, 698a). Cf. Heath (1949), Mathe-
matics in Aristotle, pp. 281-282.
4
 The formula, which is traditional, is here that of Bonamici
quoted by Koyre (1939), Etudes galiliennes, vol. I, p. 19.
5
 Quoted in the article 'reaction' in the Dictionary of
Chambers (1743), Dictionnaire de Trivoux, VEncyclopidie.
• Vossius (1695), De vitiis sermonis, iv, 20. Quoted as the
only example by DuCange (1734), Glossarium ad scriptores
mediae et infimae latinitatis, vol. v, article 'reaction'.
reactione (published, after his death, in 1525).
The De Rebus Naturalibus of Zabarella (1589)
contains a Liber de Reactione. In his Lexicon
philosophicum (1613) Goclenius gives a definition
of reactio which is abstractly extended to all
physics: Retributa seu reciprocata patientis actio
quaedam qua resistit agenti et id commutat, dum
ab eo commutatur.
In the same period (beginning of the seven-
teenth century) we find the generalized use of the
equivalent term in the vernacular languages
(French: reagir,' reaction; English: to react,
reaction; Italian: reattione, etc.). Let us venture
a hypothesis here: the term could only acquire
all its importance in a cultural climate strongly
marked by the Stoic idea of the interdependence
of all things in the universe. If all natural beings
are equal and interdependent, no action can
escape another action in return. The universal
law of reaction or retroaction causes the oblitera-
tion of the ontological privilege by which an
agent is more noble than a patient. All beings
are in turn active and passive in their reciprocal
relations. And even when the idea8 of the
qualitative superiority of the active being on the
passive being will be upheld, this superiority will
be transient (or passing), i.e. communicated
from one to another in proportion as the move-
7
 LittrS however, in his Dictionnaire (1863-77), indicates
an older usage which has the notable advantage of revealing
the presence of the term in the vocabulary of alchemy:
As fire acts in air,
Thus air reacts on water,
And water acts in air
When fire wants to wage war.
This text is at verses 460-467 of the Complainte de Nature a
Valchimiste errant. The author of this text is most probably
the painter Jean Perreal (about 1460). We have been unable
to find other examples of the verb reagir (to react) in France
before the Physique of Champeynac (1610), quoted by
Huguet (1965).
8
 Such as it is affirmed by Thomas Aquinas, from Augus-
tine and Aristotle, in the Summa Theologica, ia, LXXIX, 2, 3.
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ment spreads. The concept of reaction comes to
the aid of the passive object and confers upon
him the dignity possessed an instant before by
the agent who has made him submit to his
'impression' upon him and who must in turn
undergo an 'impression'. There is no fragment of
matter in the universe that is not capable of
resistance. At the dawn of modern times, no
cause (outside of God) is, by essence, superior to
another. All preponderance is quantitative: a
body exerts more force than another because its
mass and velocity are greater. Passivity, for the
subject that undergoes, is not the mark of an
indelible inferiority; it is a transitory situation in
which the energies of the return action are
already gathered. Thus the order of nature im-
poses an identical law for all beings, animate or
inanimate. The universe is a homogeneous space
in which the slightest alteration, the slightest
displacement, 'reacts' on the totality of beings.
In some ways these ideas are common to the
Neo-Stoics and to the Peripatetics of the Re-
naissance and the seventeenth century. They thus
prepare the ground for modern mechanics,
which will give these intuitions their quantified
expression. The article ' reaction' of the Encyclo-
pedie (translated literally from the Cyclopaedia of
Chambers, 1743) is very significant in this case.
It shows that Newton has formulated, in the
language of quantitative equality and in the sole
domain of movement of bodies, what had been
previously described by means of words in the
qualitative phenomena of nature:
The peripatetics defined reaction the impression a
body makes on that which has affected it, an impres-
sion exercised on the same part of the agent and at
the same time that the agent affects it; like water
thrown on fire1 which extinguishes the fire while it is
itself heated... But one did not know that the
reaction is always equal to the action. It was Mr.
Newton who first observed this.
Thanks to the fame of Newton, the conceptual
pair action/reaction acquires undisputed author-
ity in European thought of the eighteenth
century. Let us recall his third principle: 'For all
action, there is an equal reaction, or: the
reciprocal actions of two bodies on each other
are always equal and directed in opposite direc-
1
 The example of the water and fire is that proposed in 1644
by Sir Kenelm Digby in his Natural Bodies (xvi, 141): 'If fire
doth heate water, the water reacteth againe.. .upon the fire
and cooleth it' (as quoted in OED, article react). The example
is derived from the medieval tradition.
tions' - a notion so famous that it has come to be
a metaphoric model in many other domains.
The use of the notion can thus return to being
an image and be no more rigorous than it was in
the language of the natural philosophies before the
mathematicization of their language; none the
less, the terms by now bear the sign of the
illustrious mathematician. They are covered by a
prestigious guarantee.2
Even in theological language one evokes the
reaction of the soul to the action God exerts on
it. That contributed to bring God closer to the
creature, as the initiates of Pietism and Method-
ism hoped:3 God and internal sentiment can
meet on the same level, just as an action en-
counters a reaction. Human love and divine love
are forces that can enter into agreement.
It is to Newton, or at least to a Stoic model,
that Montesquieu is beholden when he writes:
'The parts of a state are like the parts of this
universe eternally bound by the action of one and
the reaction of the other.'4 This is not the only
example of Montesquieu's use of the lexical pair
action/reaction. Each time he applies it to the
realm of political matters, he never fails to
indicate that he has borrowed it from the
vocabulary of physics. Montesquieu does not
forget the original register from which he
borrows this conceptual tool. The comparison
serves him in making it understood that every
event and every political decision cause effects
which reflect back on the cause of these events or
on the authors of these decisions. If one dis-
passionately examines history, one can never
fail to observe the 'just return of things'; each
violent movement arouses another no less violent
movement which replies to it and sometimes
stops it. The play of action and reaction in
history ensures inevitable recurrences. In the
dynamics of history it represents what the play
of weights and counterweights ensures in the
1
 The dictionary of Feraud (1788) makes a state of a mode:
reaction, to react 'are used in writings on all sorts of matters'.
The beguiling efficacy of the lexical pair aciionjreaction is
never felt more than in the cosmosophic speculations of the
end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nine-
teenth century. One need only name Goethe, Schelling,
Edgar Poe (Eureka). Edgar Poe's speculation will find a late
echo in the Art Poetique of Claudel (1907).
• In 1771 the theologian Wesley evokes 'a continual action
of God upon the Soul and a re-action of the Soul upon God'
(Works, 1872, vol. v, p. 232). The example is quoted from
OED, article 'reaction'.
1
 Montesquieu (1743), Considerations sur les causes de la
grandeur des Remains et de leur decadence, chap. ix.
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domain of the statics of institutions. To be more
specific: if men do not succeed in preserving
political stability by the balance of internal forces
in the state, violence will prevail under one form
or another; then, by a law as compelling as the
laws of physics, the violence exercised by one
party or faction will arouse a reaction which will
prevent the new power from prevailing perma-
nently. Sooner or later a new balance will be
established to be broken once again. In the
events that follow, action and reaction come to
re-establish violently a balance that men have
not been able to establish peaceably by the
reciprocal limitation of powers. Montesquieu is
convinced that there is always a price to pay for
the excess of power: sometimes it is even a high
price. For Montesquieu we see the image of
action and reaction fill the operative role that we
entrust (sometimes with less precision) to the
concept of dialectic1 or feedback.
REACTION VS. PROGRESS
The passage of the word reaction into the register
of political vocabulary is accompanied by a
modification of its value.
We know that Saussure calls the value2 of a
word the resultant of the relations it maintains
in a given moment with all the other words of the
language. According to a comparison proposed
by the linguist of Geneva, the value of a word
resembles that of a chess piece at the moment of
a game. It derives from its place in the game, its
position in relation to all the other pieces, and
the importance given it by pre-existing rules.
Among the components of this value, we must
add, the greatest attention must be given to
terms which enter into an antonymous relation
with the word considered. The value of a word
in a given language context depends in large part
on pairs it can form with opposite terms - be
they reciprocal or complementary.
In the language of physical representation, we
have seen that the word reaction appeared so as
to constitute a pair of reciprocals with action,
thus competing with the pair of opposites action/
passion. Actionjreaction, in the sense of Newton-
1
 One grasps the passage from the concept 'of universal
reciprocal action' to that of 'dialectic' in its essence in the
Anti-Diihring of Engels (1878) (Introduction, chap, i):
'nature is the testing ground of dialectic'.
1
 Saussure (1916), Cours de linguistiqtie generate, second
part, chap. iv.
ian mechanics, constitutes a compensated pair,
where the second term only increases the first by
affecting it with a prefix (re), one of whose effects
is to indicate reciprocity or inverse movement.
To be sure, reaction is always second, and even
if one supposes it to appear instantaneously, it is
a response to an action that has come first. But
reaction is not, like passion, the logical or
ontological opposite of action; it is another
action, equal in dignity, of the same nature, and
differs only in its orientation in space.
In the language of politics, qualitative opposi-
tion can insinuate itself again in the verbal pair
action/reaction. In fact, as soon as the word
action receives a laudatory distinction, it
becomes inevitable that reaction will in return
find itself with a 'negative' and pejorative dis-
tinction. From then on it is no longer a comple-
ment but an opposite. This transformation is
only possible because to convey this new sense,
the prefix ' r e ' also acquiesces to signifying back-
ward movement in relation to an action which
itself advances in the right direction. The ap-
pearance of this new value of the word reaction
goes along with the attribution of greater im-
portance to the 'perfecting' which can develop
in the course of time. From the end of the
eighteenth century, the approval given to a
certain type of historic action defined as 'progress'
brings with it the meaning of 'conduct hostile to
progress' for the word reaction. In a revolution-
ary period this meaning is all the more im-
periously insisted on as the happiness promised
is delayed in coming. This delay must be ex-
plained and above all a name must be given to
the forces, to the ideas and to the men who are
accused of being responsible. It is thus that the
decade 1790-1800 sees the birth of the pejorative
political acceptance of reaction and of the
neologisms 'reactor' (used notably by Babeuf to
stigmatize the counter-revolutionaries) and 're-
actionary ' (formed on the model of revolution-
ary).3 In the new conceptual pair action/reaction,
which was formed following the French Revo-
lution, the qualitative opposition prevails once
again and it is linked to the representation of an
antagonism developed in the space-time frame-
work of history. The presupposition of a true
sense of history and of a true duty of man is
3
 For these new meanings and these derived terms, cf.
Brunot (1967), Histoire de la langue francaise, des origines a
1900, vol. ix, 2, p. 837n, and pp. 843-844.
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posed beforehand by virtue of a prefix of direc-
tion pro (in progress) and by its opposite re (in
reaction). To be sure, the dictionaries of the
period defined reaction as the retort of an
'oppressed party that takes vengeance and acts
in turn'. Reaction can come from the 'right' as
from the 'left' if one believes in this neutral
meaning. But very quickly, even in prudent
writers, the term reaction designates a return
backwards, a ' retrogradation', a destruction of
happy changes come about in the State.
In his pamphlet entitled Des reactionspolitiques
(1797) Benjamin Constant writes: 'When a
revolution that has been carried beyond its
limits stops, one first restores it within its bound-
aries. But one is not content with restoring it
within its boundaries; it is pushed as far back-
wards as it had advanced forward. Moderation
ends and reactions begin.' These new meanings
and new linguistic values mark the growing role
played from the end of the eighteenth century
(and up to our day) by the image of a socio-
historical becoming, bearer of beneficent changes
for all of humanity, provided that men rise to the
task and fight against those among them who
create an obstacle. The stunning success of the
scheme action (progress) vs. reaction is due to the
fact that it arouses hope and designates an
adversary.
VITAL REACTIONS
If one supposes that the consecration of a medical
notion is to be measured by its presence in a
dictionary that records it, we must then observe
that the word reaction was recognized very late
in medical nomenclature. To my knowledge, as
far as France is concerned, no medical dictionary
mentions the term reaction before the beginning
of the nineteenth century. There is no trace of the
word in the Lexicon Medicum of B. Castelli
(last edition, 1746). The Medical Dictionary of
Robert James (for which I have Diderot's
translation, 1746-8) does not mention it either.
Neither the Cyclopaedia of Chambers (5th
edition, 1743) nor the Encyclopedic of Diderot
and d'Alembert give it any medical or physio-
logical meaning.
Even if reaction is not yet a concept worthy of
being catalogued in a medical lexicon, the
naturalists and doctors of that century did not
abstain from using the word: it is an explanatory
auxiliary which translates the phenomena of life
into the language of general physics and of
philosophy. Those who have some familiarity
with the scientific literature of the eighteenth
century know that the lexical pair action/
reaction is often invoked; in fact they have
recourse to it every time they want to give the
approximate formula of an interdependence and
a vital faculty of response. This is true for J. T.
Needham,1 the vitalists of Montpellier, W.
Cullen and his pupils of Edinburgh, and D.
Diderot in his meditations on life. The pair
action/reaction often covers confused intuitions
which do not go beyond a pseudo-demonstration
of a totally verbal nature.
Of course, the mechanical image of action and
reaction was able to lend itself to the still very
general statement of what will later be called
'stimulus and response' or 'reflex'. We note that
in this first theory of nervous functions reaction
is conceived mechanically, without anything
intervening to specify the real nature of the
biological act with regard to the external
stimulant. A sequence is described where the
reaction, as a general rule, is proportional to the
action; the acting force and the reacting force
are held to be homogeneous and of the same
nature. Through the detour of chemical analogies
they meanwhile begin to move toward the state-
ment that in physiology will be expressed by the
law of all-or-nothing. Buffon says nothing
unacceptable, but neither does he say anything
very rigorous, when he writes in the Discours sur
la nature des animaux: 'Objects act on an animal
by means of the senses and the animal reacts on
objects by his exterior movements; in general,
action is the cause and reaction is the effect.'
But he goes on:
One might perhaps say at this point that the effect is
not at all proportional to the cause; that in solid
bodies, which follow the laws of mechanics, the
reaction is always equal to the action, but that in
animal bodies the external movement or the reaction
is incomparably larger than the action... But it is
easy to answer... With a spark one sets fire to a
gunpowder magazine and makes a fortress explode
. . . Consequently it should not seem extraordinary
that a light impression on the senses can produce a
1
 For Needham and his reference to the concept of 'action
and reaction' see Roger (1963), Les Sciences de la vie dans la
pensee francaise du XVIW siecle, pp. 504-520.
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violent reaction in an animal's body which is mani-
fested by external movements.1
Very large use is made of the pair action/reaction
at the end of the eighteenth century in all the
theories on the relationship of the physical and
the mental. The lexical pair act/react permits the
description of a double causality, a circle of
causes and effects where, once sensitivity has
been placed as a general principle, no factor can
claim absolute priority or preponderance. From
the pen of Cabanis we read these most character-
istic of all lines:
One must not . . . be surprised that the operations
which grouped together bear the name of mental, are
in relation to those other operations which are more
specifically designated by the name of physical, and
that they act and react on one another, even if one
wanted to consider the various organic functions as
determined by two or more different principles . . .
Organs are only able to enter into action and
execute certain movements in so far as they are
endowed with life or are sensitive; it is sensitivity
that animates them, it is by virtue of its laws that
they receive impressions or determine to move. The
impressions received by their sentient extremities are
transmitted to the centre of reaction; and this partial
or general centre sends to the corresponding organ
the determinations which all together constitute the
proper functions of this organ... Whether these
impressions have been received by external or
internal sentient extremities, or whether their cause
has acted at the seat of the cerebral pulp itself, they
always end up in a reaction centre that reflects them
as determinations, movements, functions, towards
the parts to which each of these operations is
attributed. This action and reaction can often take
place without the individual being aware of it.2
The area thus covered by the notion of action
and reaction is remarkably vast. As we have just
seen, it includes the unperceived phenomena of
the autonomic nervous system, the subconscious
of organic life. It covers the whole domain of
responses that the 'reaction centres' bring to the
perceptible stimulations coming from the outside
world or internal organs. It is also applied both
to the incitements emitted by the 'cerebral pulp'
and to those produced at the level of the organs
1
 Buffbn (1836), Oeuvres completes, vol. iv, pp. 364-365.
For the role of the image of explosion in the formation of the
notion of reflex cf. Canguilhem (1955), La formation du
concept de re'flexe.
1
 Cabanis (1802), Rapports du physique et du moral de
I'homme, onzieme memoire, chap. I.
themselves. Let us underline here the use of the
verb reflect, used doubtless by virtue of the
prefix re which brings it close to react. In the
work of Cabanis reflect is a multivalent term
which designates by turns the return of a force in
movement (here, sensation) to its source-
reflected attention, motor reflex (the inter-
dependence of the physical and the mental), etc.
Cabanis often refers to ' analysis'; but in resort-
ing to the concept of action and reaction, or to
that of reflected movement, he employs a
ubiquitous metaphor which dispenses him from
pushing his analyses beyond a certain point,
because these terms lead to believe that the
analysis has been pushed back to the elementary
base. It will be up to the following generation to
dismember the too vast territory of reaction so
as to isolate, with narrower but more specific
concepts, the types of phenomena best suited to
experimental investigation.
Around 1820 there are many who state that
the concept of reaction has received such broad
acceptance that it becomes applicable to all
phenomena of life.3 Now in the domain of
sciences, too broad a concept is no longer
functional.
The concept of action/reaction was taken from
mechanics and does not authorize the establish-
ment of a difference in nature between the acting
force and the reacting force. The cerebral
' centre of reaction' is the place where sensation
is modified into 'ideas', 'volition', 'attention';
all that reflows or is reflected towards the
periphery at the level of the centre, is always
nothing but sensation. The same energy develops
in the two directions - centripetal and centri-
fugal: 'Sensation, which at first seems to have
flowed from the circumference to the centre,
returns later from the centre to the circum-
ference, and . . . in a word, the nerves exert a
veritable reaction on themselves regarding feel-
ing, just as they exercise another reaction on the
3
 'Life is a series of impressions received and reactions
performed by the different sensitive centres', writes Delpit
(1820) in the article 'reaction' of the Dictionnaire des Sciences
Medicates. 'Just as we live ceaselessly under the influence of
physical stimulations and mental affections, it follows that
outside the time of sleep, we live under the rule of continual
reaction', states Bricheteau (1827) in the article 'reaction' of
the Encyclopedic Methodique (Medecine) vol. xn. Later on, in
1874, Bernheim recognizes that 'the word reaction has taken
on such a large sense. . . that is can no longer be defined, that
it no longer bears a precise meaning' (article 'reaction' of
the Dictionnaire Encyclopedique des Sciences Medicates, 3rd
series, vol. II).
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muscular parts for movement.' The pair action/
reaction, in its mechanical meaning of reciprocal
action, does not prefer any of its constituent
terms; it constitutes the model of functioning
required by a materialist and monistic system,
which intends to dispense with the Cartesian
hypothesis of a non-material, free, self-willed
soul.1 The idea of reaction therefore covers a
highly polemic idea, since it is proposed as an
explanatory principle, in place of the 'thinking
substance'. Thought itself is nothing but a
reaction among many.2
However, if the idea of reaction met with
brilliant success at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, it is not in the meaning Cabanis
gives it, but rather in the sense that the vitalist
theory confers upon it. The vitalists held to the
idea of a 'vital principle', irreducible to sole
physico-chemical phenomena. Now the charac-
teristic of the 'vital principle' is to harmonize the
various functions of the organism and to defend
it against the blows of harmful agents.
It is here that the concept of reaction inter-
venes in a new sense: it is the original response
that the organism opposes, under the direction
of the 'vital principle', to all that endangers its
survival. When the word reaction made its
entrance into medical dictionaries at the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century, it was given a
strictly vitalist significance. Here is the definition
given by Capuron:
A kind of movement which tends to prevent or
destroy the effects of all harmful powers applied to
the animal organism and that certain doctors have
attributed to what they call the medicating force
1
 Cabanis (1802), Rapports du physique et du moral de
I'homme, deuxiime memoire, Histoire physiologique des
sensations, paragraph vi. A few lines later Cabanis goes on to
say 'that sensibility acts like a fluid whose total quantity is
determined and which, every time it casts itself in greater
abundance in one of its channels, diminishes proportionately
in the others'. On the role of this metaphor in the history of
psychiatric thought and on the image Freud makes of it cf.
our study 'Sur les fluides imaginaires', in La relation critique,
Paris, 1970, pp. 196-213.
' This will be affirmed later by empiricists like Mach
(1902), Die Analyse der Empfindungen, pp. 245-246. In the
Cahiers of Paul Valery (1973), we find the peremptory
affirmation: 'The notions of thought, knowledge, etc. must
be discarded. Those of act and reaction must replace them'
(I, 954). The psychology of Jean Piaget, which insists on
action, assimilation and accommodation seems aimed entirely
at resuming and surpassing, in a decidedly active sense, all
that the long dominant concept of reaction led to believe
about the necessary link between the individual and the
surrounding world: knowledge is a constructed response.
of nature, vegetable principle, soul, organism
etc.3
The essential idea is thus that of resistance (one
will note the reappearance of the prefix re)
whose secret belongs to living beings and to
them alone. There exists, therefore, a kind of
reaction that is the privilege of life and, even
more, is the very definition of life. The opening
lines of the famous book of Xavier Bichat should
be recalled here:
One seeks the definition of life in abstract considera-
tions: it will be found, I believe, in this general
insight: life is that group of functions which resist
death. The mode of existence of living bodies is such
in effect, that all which surrounds them tends to
destroy them. Inorganic bodies act incessantly on
them; they themselves exert continuous action on
each other; they would soon succumb if they did not
have a permanent principle of reaction within them;
this is the principle of life; unknown in its nature it
cannot be appreciated except by its phenomena.
Now, the most general of these phenomena is this
habitual alternative of action on the part of exterior
bodies and of reaction on the part of living bodies; an
alternative whose proportions vary depending on the
age.
There is a superabundance of life in a child because
reaction exceeds action. The adult sees an equilib-
rium develop between the two, and because of that,
this vital excess disappears. The reaction of the
internal principle diminishes in the old man, while
the action of external bodies remains the same; then
life languishes and goes imperceptibly towards its
natural end, which arrives when all proportion
ceases.
The measure of life is therefore, in general, the
difference that exists between the effort of external
forces and that of internal resistance. The excess of
the former announces its weakness; the predomi-
nance of the latter is the sign of its strength.4
We meet here with an agonistic definition of life:
life only exists as long as it can pursue the
struggle against the hostility of the non-living
world. If to live is to react, one is tempted to
consider all reaction, of whatever nature it may
be, as a healthy effort of the organism. There can
3
 Capuron (1806), Nouveau dictionnaire de midecine, de
chirurgie, de physique. Capuron's definition is repeated
unchanged by Hanin (1811), Vocabulaire medical, and again
in the first edition of Nysten (1814), Dictionnaire de medecine.
For the spiritualism of Capuron (a former Oratorian) and the
vitalism of Nysten (disciple of Bichat), cf. Florkin (1954),
Medecine et me'decins au pays de Liege, pp. 169-190.
4
 Bichat (1800), Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la
mort, first part, article I.
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be nothing but good reactions. And just as
Hippocratic medicine tended to favour 'the
medicinal force of nature', vitalist medicine
wants to be nothing more than the art of provok-
ing or favouring reaction, to the point that one
can count on the presence of the principle of
resistance. Should a fever arise, one will see in it
the indication, favourable in itself, of a mobiliza-
tion of defensive energies.1
It is difficult to preserve such a general
principle pure and undivided. After having
identified reaction and life, Bichat feels the need
of subdivisions: animal life and organic life are
to be differentiated. And the notion of reaction,
so important at first, becomes slightly blurred in
the rest of the work. By its very generality the
concept is not easily manageable; by itself it does
not permit the definition of the various func-
tions.
The authors who spoke of reaction around
1820 proceeded in turn to some distinctions. In
this regard the articles of medical encyclopedias
are of great interest. Delpit2 separates physical
and mental reaction. What is physical reaction?
It is the defensive energy mentioned by Bichat:
i t ' acts against all causes of destruction, derives
its means in the more or less constituted ele-
ments of the structure and is found essentially
bound to the vital properties which, by presiding
over all functions, direct the acts of preservation
of the individual or the species'. But physical
reaction consists also in the 'uninterrupted circle
of reciprocal influences' which links the opera-
tions or functions of the different organs among
themselves. Can one assert that reaction always
infallibly assures the defence of the individual?
Do we not observe the occurrence of harmful
reactions? Delpit, who does not exert himself to
respect vitalist orthodoxy, makes a point of
1
 For another physiologist fifty years later the concept of
reaction intervenes once again in a fundamental definition.
But for Moritz Schiff, it is no longer a question of defining
life in general: it is a question of the speciality of animal life.
And reaction is no longer conceived as a response to an
external environment; it establishes the solidarity of the parts.
'There exists . . . in the animal a reciprocal reaction of all the
parts in which one can respond to the irritation of the other.
This reciprocal unity gives the animal a kind of individuality
that is lacking in plants.' Schiff (1894). Recueils des me'moires
physiologiques. I, p. 464.
' Delpit (1820), Dictionnaire des sciences medicates, vol.
47, article 'reaction'. This physician, doctor at the University
of Montpellier, was the friend of Maine De Biran with whom
he founded the Medical Society of Bergerac in 1806. Cf.
Biran (1954), Journal.
25
aberrant reactions against which medicine must
intervene.
This physical reaction cannot constantly be deter-
mined by conservative views, nor can it always be
confined within convenient limits. Thus the reaction
of the organs of generation, when too strongly
exercised by the impression of stimulating sub-
stances, can reflect on the cerebral organ and deter-
mine all the phenomena of sexual neuroses. The
reaction of the blood system against obstacles placed
in the way of circulation by defective formation or a
momentary disturbance of the organs, can determine
the rupture of the vessels or an equally dangerous
outpouring of blood. Therefore the physical reaction
of organs has its aberrations and its excesses; to be
beneficial it must remain under the influence of care-
ful medical care and with this help create a barrier
against harmful deviations.
In Delpit's view then, the reassuring teleology of
reaction allows some exceptions: in these cases
therapeutic measures must come to the rescue.
Without going so far as to dispute the generally
favourable nature of physical reactions, Delpit
admits that on certain occasions they exceed
limits and must be contained. It is what Bricheteau,
in another publication,3 calls 'pathological re-
action'. Nevertheless, it is there that therapeutic
intervention finds its model: in arousing a new
reaction, a counter-reaction, one can stop patho-
logical phenomena:
Let an organ like the stomach or the brain, etc. be
seriously injured, upset in its parts; aside from the
local injury, as a result of a strong reaction, mishaps
occur in a multitude of other organs: a fever
develops, there is difficulty in breathing, trouble in
the functioning of the liver, the kidneys, the intestinal
tract, etc. Would you like to use this reaction to the
advantage of the entire organism? Administer an
emetic whose action will affect the brain, or else
apply mustard plasters to the feet, so as to obtain the
same result.
The multiplied sympathies of organs sometimes
yield to double reactions or reflected reactions...
We can see that the concept of reaction is
allowed to be used in all senses. It dispenses with
adducing a pathenogenic mechanism or a mode
of action which might be specific or subtle. It
assures the appearance of an explanation without
3
 Bricheteau (1827), Encyclopedie Methodique, Me'decine,
vol. xii, article 'reaction'. Isidore Bricheteau (1789-1861)
was doctor at the Necker hospital and member of the
Academy of Medicine.
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having recourse to a cause or to means any more
specific than those designated by the all-purpose
word of that same period, 'sympathy'.1
MENTAL REACTION
The dichotomy of the 'mental' and the 'physical'
offers an ideal pair for the comings and goings of
action and reaction. If an organ is irritated it will
react on the brain. The troubles of the spirit of
somatic origin will be described as the effects
of a reaction. Delpit does nothing more than
transcribe some very old affirmations, well
formulated by Galen, into a renewed language.
Here the word reaction modernizes the tradi-
tional statement:
The exercise of physical reaction is not limited to the
systems or to the organs of which our body is com-
posed; in certain cases we see it affect the mind as
well. Any alteration of an organ reacts with vehem-
ence on the faculties of the spirit or the affections of
the soul. Thus the stomach, excited by wine or other
liquors, reacts on the mind which at that point
becomes more lively, sharper and more ready with
witty remarks. Swelling of the liver and of the spleen
bring sadness, discouragement, melancholy, etc.2
It goes without saying that the opposite is also
considered true and that 'the mental is able to
act on the physical'. Thus can Bricheteau write:
As with the organs, the body and mind of man, con-
sidered abstractly, act on one another. A man taken
ill, will have difficulty recovering if he is dominated
by sad feelings and bitter grief; in the same manner
it is unlikely that an ailing man can use his faculties
with success. In the first case, eliminate the mental
ailment and you will react on the illness; in the
second, make the suffering cease and you will re-
establish the free exercise of the intellectual faculties.
This means that physical forces can be immediately
debilitated or re-established by the influence of a
great and deep impression. Joy and terror can bring
death, just as great excitement of another nature
seems to mend the fabric of life or resuscitate the
exercise of functions that seemed permanently
1
 Among historians the term has led to confusion. There is
a great difference to be established between cosmic sym-
pathies, postulated by the paracelsian doctors of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries and physiological sympathies for
which the theory was developed in the eighteenth century by
the school of Montpellier and especially by P. J. Barthez. It
could be demonstrated that the system of sympathy developed
concurrently with the system of reaction and that both were
supplanted at the same time by the recognition of reflex
movements.
2
 Delpit (1820), Dictionnaire des sciences medicates, vol. 47,
article 'reaction'.
destroyed. A mountaineer far from his native land
falls victim to nostalgia, loses his strength and can
barely take a few steps in a hospital which seems
destined to be his tomb. Give him hope of seeing his
mountains again and all is changed. He recovers his
strength, his appetite and the use of his legs. Do you
want to react on the mental state of an unhappy man
who is being secretly undermined by a deep grief
caused by reverses of fortune? Instead of giving him
drugs, imitate, if you can, the great practictioner of
the last century who after having unsuccessfully
treated a businessman in difficulty with his business,
cured him almost immediately by giving him a pre-
scription of thirty thousand francs to be filled by his
notary.3
We must distinguish in this text between the
affirmation of principle and the illustrative
examples. In principle there is nothing against a
reactive theory of physical alterations due to
passions and to disorders of the mind. The
notion of reaction can be perfectly applied to
what we call today - with a controversial term -
the psychogenesis4 of somatic ailments or mental
illnesses.
Bricheteau, on the other hand, scarcely dwells
on this. Does the idea of the mental cause of a
great number of physical ailments and mental
disorders seem to be self evident ? It was certainly
common currency, and perhaps it seemed so
unquestionable that nothing indicated the need
for calling upon the concept of reaction on its
behalf.
A mountaineer far from home is a potential
victim for nostalgia: financial troubles secretly
undermine the health of a businessman unhappy
about business; this is considered undebatable
evidence according to the tradition of a psycho-
somatic doctrine already perfectly formulated by
Stoic philosophy and by Galen. To express the
pathogenic role of an idea or a passion it is the
concept of influence which is most frequently
utilized. Everything takes place as if one pre-
ferred to keep the concept of reaction in reserve.
Why? For what purpose? To give it a very
particular role in the mechanism of spontaneous
or induced recovery. The word thus designates a
promise of healing that the doctor hopes to
encourage or arouse. Here at the level of
' Bricheteau (1827), Encyclopedie mithodique, me'decine,
vol. xit, article 'reaction'.
4
 Cf. Lewis (1972), 'Psychogenic': a word and its muta-
tions.
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psychotherapy, the concept of reaction again
takes on the defensive value that Bichat
had given it in the general order of vital
faculties.
In the examples proposed by Bricheteau a
supplementary notion comes to connote re-
action: it is abruptness, the sudden effect. From
that point, reaction appears as an instantaneous
event; it achieves a brusque overturning; it
resuscitates. Mental ailment is to be cured, or
organic troubles caused by passion are to be
relieved, by producing an idea or emotion which
will unleash the good reaction in a single stroke.
For a long time doctors had imagined mental
disturbance under the almost literal aspect of the
breakdown of a machine. What resource should
be used to recover the harmonious arrangement
of faculties? First of all, a shock: physical shock
(cold, a blow, whirling) and mental shock
(fright, surprise, joy, etc.). One expected an
effect similar to that of a magic wand or more
simply like the jolt that sets a stopped watch
working. What better scientific name to give it
then, if not that of reaction ?
All the naive staging set up by the old medicine
of the spirit and by the psychiatry of the nine-
teenth century find their justification in the hope
of arousing the decisive reaction. A phantasm of
immediate recovery thus comes to inhabit the
concept of reaction. To react is a phasic pheno-
menon whose effects always manifest themselves
immediately. Thus the word reaction takes on
here a strong antonymous charge: it is not only
the contrary of some action come before which
has endangered organic or psychic integrity. It
implies a marvellous rapidity which is opposed to
all that is secret, slow, chronic, in the process of
illness. In the admirable Adieu of Balzac, when
he reconstructs the scene of the battle of Beresina
around the mad young countess, it is to make her
re-live the initial moment of her madness, after
years of illness, and to induce a kind of instan-
taneous curative reaction. This latter does not
fail to occur, but with such violence that the
young woman, once given consciousness, cannot
bear it and dies immediately.
But Balzac, who nevertheless knows the medi-
cal vocabulary well, does not speak expressly of
'reaction'. What he mentions in his story is the
sudden return of will in a being who had been
abandoned by that faculty: 'Human will came
with its electric flow and revived this body from
which it had been absent so long.'1 Balzac has
not strayed for all this from the doctrine of
reaction such as it was formulated in 1820. In
this doctrine the restitution of voluntary energy
is the final result of mental reaction. This for
Delpit is the complete achievement: 'The mental
reaction has its source in courage, in this strong
determination of the soul which raises itself
above all pains, masters all impressions and
substitutes for them acts of will.'2
The mental reaction can thence be defined as
the act of courage that yields will; it is the event
by which the individual is brought back to the
possibility of being newly active and free.
Reaction takes on such a positive value, so
charged with combative energy that it becomes a
veritable action. But have we not come full
circle ? From the moment one supposes that the
source of reaction is courage has one not lost the
match? As in all moralizing theories of psycho-
logical recovery, does one not assume precisely
the faculty that is lacking and that must be
recovered? For it is by a simple verbal artifice
that Delpit distinguishes between the source of
reaction (courage) and its effects (the acts of will
that substitute 'impressions' of pain). It must be
admitted that in many circumstances discourage-
ment, and as a consequence the impossibility of
reaction, prevails. The alleged 'source' dries up.
Delpit does not formulate this objection but he
anticipates it. If courage fails the patient, it
should not fail the doctor, and thence all is
saved: the reaction will take place. By now the
game is played in the 'doctor-patient rela-
tion'.
The doctrine of mental reaction, for today's
reader, has all its interest in the role it makes the
doctor play. Between the Hippocratic tradition
(which insists on the virtues necessary for a
doctor: serenity, temperance, kindness)3 and
contemporary psychosomatic medicine, which
invites the consideration of transfer and the
function of the 'doctor as a drug' (Balint), one
must not fail to notice the reflection that
1
 Balzac (1966), Adieu, in La comedie humaine, l'lntegrale,
vol. vn, p. 58. The principal text of Balzac is Louis Lambert:
the theory of will as it is developed by the hero of this novel
is a doctrine of action and reaction. We have devoted more
thorough attention to this in Starobinski (1975), La vie et les
aventures du mot 'reaction'.
2
 Delpit (1820), Dictionnaire des sciences medicales.
3
 Cf. in particular the treatise Du Midecin and De la
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develops in the romantic age around the concept
of reaction. It is an essential link. The figure of
the doctor finds itself invested with a greater
authority and social role. A myth is constructed
that surrounds the doctor with an aura of power,
and it is not incorrect to see in this the beginning
of a new prestige attached to the medical pro-
fession which had been relatively discredited up
to the end of the eighteenth century. Particularly
evident is a special attention, still a bit vague and
pompous, devoted to the personal influence of
the therapist. As we know, this interest will
become more particularly explicit in the follow-
ing decades of the nineteenth century at the time
of the debates on hypnosis, suggestion and
hysteria: psychoanalysis is born in their exten-
sion.
In 1820, when the doctrine of mental reaction
is pronounced, the doctor appears as a possessor
of energy and courage. By a sort of contagion or
fluidic influence, he is capable of infusing the
patient with the mental resource of reaction.
Delpit avoids all allusion to animal magnestism,
but others will be less reserved. As soon as will
and courage are represented as communicable
substances, there is a great temptation to take
the image literally and to imagine a kind of
energetic 'transfusion' between the doctor and
the patient. We will cite a characteristic page of
Delpit. We can measure how far from it we are,
but in what he says of the assistance the doctor
offers in a healing reaction, we will observe that
he did not fail to recognize the feelings of the
patient (his need to pour out his soul, his need
to be loved) nor the conditions of transfer
(prefigured here by the more mild term of
'confidence').
Not all illnesses have as their basis the alteration of
organs or the disorder of their functions; also, not all
diseases respond to cathartics, narcotics, tonics or
blood lettings. The doctor, who is obliged to offer
resistance to the sad ravages of boredom, of ambition,
of grief, of love, needs a different medical background
than that formed by potions and pills. When courage
is demolished by reverses of fortune, the torment of
passion, a deep feeling of great grief, the fear of a
pressing danger, can the good doctor resort only to a
material therapy? Will he not have to rise to the
hidden springs which move our passions, which can
develop the courage of the spirit, the source of so
many heroic acts and such marvellous cures? Will
he not, in certain cases, have to give a direction to
certain impressions of the soul which might then
react with success on physical impressions and
modify them completely ? . . .
Joy, hope, all sweet and agreeable sentiments
fortify the soul and give it the means to react with
success on muscular forces and on organs which
perform vital functions. All that elevates the soul
strengthens the body, said Seneca; but what senti-
ment can raise the afflicted soul of one crushed by
pain, consumed by illness, one whose structure is
threatened by complete dissolution? Where will he
derive the courage necessary to react on the material
causes of destruction, to stop or suspend its progress ?
Oh, if a means is still left to revive the hopes that
each instant seems to destroy, this means will be
found only in the confidence inspired by the doctor.
How powerful this source is when handled by an
able hand. How many storms aroused by mental
emotions are calmed by the voice of the doctor,
whose duty is mixed here with that of the most
delicate friendship. The unhappy patient needs to
pour forth his soul: who better than the doctor is
used to lending an attentive ear to the long list of
afflictions. Also, the patient has hope in him and this
confidence is already a restorative balm, a gentle
stimulant to the whole organism. In turn the doctor
must neglect no means of inspiring or fortifying this
confidence since it can so happily reinforce the action
of the medication and so effectively help the reaction
of the mind on the body. Calm and serene air,
affectionate care, language that is easy to under-
stand, promises stripped of exaggeration, foreign
luminaries called for consultation, speech in which
science discards all that is obscure and severe, where
language borrows the expression of the heart and
interest, all this in the manner, the words, the actions
of the doctor must help to strengthen this confidence,
which contains a powerful means of arousing the
entire being and of preparing favourable solutions
to the ailment.
Further on Delpit adds: 'More than anything
else men need to be loved, and this sentiment is
sweeter and more paternal for them when it is
offered by those whom they have already
entrusted with the care of their lives.'1
In the meaning that is specified here, reaction
is a curative process which is accomplished
thanks to the psychic energy of the doctor. The
therapist is considered the master of reactions;
if he is intelligent he will know how to choose
words, gestures, at times even physical means,
which infallibly determine the awakening of the
mental forces of the patient and the victory over
his illness. He is a fighter who communicates his
1
 Delpit (1820), Dictionnaire des sciences medicates, vol. 47,
article 'reaction'.
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vigour; he gives the 'patient' the faculty to
become once again a voluntary 'agent'; he
frees him from the servitude of 'passion'. Now,
the ideal image of this liberation (as of all
liberation - our political myths are proof of this)
makes it happen in a ' rapid' illumination where
suddenly courage, conscience and sanctity
triumph. The immediate effect attributed to
reaction will permit explaining 'naturally' that
which popular belief retained a miracle. Once
the figure of the doctor has become that of the
'lay saint' how can it help but inherit healing
powers which belonged to ancient religious
figures ?
It is highly significant to see Hippolyte
Bernheim, in the article of the Dictionnaire
Dechambre (1874) draw our attention to the
effects experienced from emotion and on the
sudden healings of nervous ailments. The interest
is in hysteria:
The doctor... threatens a woman who has hysteric
convulsions with showering or actual cautery and
succeeds with this intimidation, in certain cases, in
preventing the return of attacks. He stops the
epidemics of hysterical convulsions, of demono-
mania, by suppressing the mental causes that have
produced them and by impressing other emotions on
brains excited by unhealthy passions. Some nervous
ailments in which the brain seems to take no part can
be cured rapidly under the influence of a strong
emotion, even when they have resisted all therapeutic
agents.. .The hysterical contraction of limbs, after
having resisted all medication for months and years,
and when the medulla was believed sclerotic, could
sometimes recover immediately under the influence
of an event that strongly strikes the imagination.1
Bernheim calls Laycock and Charcot to witness
and quotes them at length. Like them he appeals
to these cures to combat 'the supernatural in
therapeutics' and the belief in miracles as mani-
fested in the cult of relics or pilgrimages to
Lourdes. At the time of this article Bernheim
makes no mention of ' suggestion' of which, at
Nancy, he was to become an assiduous experi-
menter and theoretician.2 In the doctrine he will
elaborate, suggestion will become the effective
agent of all instantaneous healing. At that point
the concept of reaction can pass to the second
1
 Article 'rdaction' of Bernheim (1874), Dictionnaire
encyclopidique des sciences medicates, vol. 2.
' On his role on the scope of modern psychiatry, cf.
Ellenberger (1970), Discovery of the Unconscious, pp. 85-89
et passim.
state . . . Vitalist teleology seemed untenable to
Bernheim:
Those who would seriously like to admit a vital
principle stand guard over the organism like a vigil
sentinel which discards all that is harmful; those who
actually admit that all reaction is a healing effect of
this vital principle make the best of a primitive
doctrine going back to the infancy of our science,
and revolt against all the progress of modern
anatomy, physiology and biology.
Of course there are 'adapted reflex movements',
but 'is it necessary to invoke the existence of a
special principle in charge of our defence?'.
Not at all. Biological laws obey their own
necessity: 'Bound to the properties and structure
of our tissues, reaction is produced without
knowing if it will be useful, harmful or indifferent
to the organism . . . the history of reactions is all
of pathology.' If everything is reaction in
pathology, everything concerns reaction in thera-
peutics: 'To provoke or encourage useful
reactions, to prevent or combat those that are
dangerous, that is the whole role of the doctor
. . . The whole art of healing is in the science of
reactions.' 'Reaction' as an all-purpose concept
covers too many phenomena to designate each
of them with sufficient precision. By saying too
much, this word says nothing.3 Only 'mental
react ion ' -a particular case in the psycho-
neurological domain - is delineated with greater
clarity. Must one renounce recourse to this
term?
In fact, it was destined to recover a new
pertinence but in an entirely different, more
determined and more limited meaning. At the
same time that the concept dissolves because it
can be evoked everywhere and at all levels - in
the regulations which maintain the constancy of
the internal environment, in the adaptation to
the external environment, in each response
following a stimulus observable by the psycho-
logist - one reserves the need for a term which,
among the etiologies of diseases, defines in
general those where neither an organic lesion,
nor the direct effect of an infection, nor an
• For Bernard (1865) 'the most superficial examination of
all that happens around us shows us that all natural pheno-
mena come from the reactions of bodies upon each other'
{Introduction a I'Etude de la Midecine experimentale, ll, I,
vn). Research will only become exact when it will apply itself
to intercepting the determinism that governs 'the reciprocal
and simultaneous reactions of the internal environment on
the organs and of the organs on the internal environment'
(ii, ii, 3).
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anomaly of functions due strictly to constitution,
are present. From then on the tendency will be
to reserve the use of'reaction' and 'reactional'
to designate a particular type of causality of
illness: all ailment that can be assimilated to
behaviour aroused by an external event is
reactional.
The appearance of the adjective 'reactional'
in the French language dates back to 1869.
Littr6, who includes this word in his Diction-
naire, marks it as a neologism and defines it
broadly: 'That which relates to an organic
reaction. The reactional power of an organ
against a disease bearing action.' But as general
as the definition may be, one must not be content
with seeing the persistence of the vitalist tradition
in this term; it is called into existence as much by
the need to thwart organicist imperialism, which
had long prevailed in the course of the century.
The interpretation by lesion, inflammation and
neoformation would have to have triumphed,
anatomical documents in hand, for the class of
ailments sine materia to be defined, regrouped,
and qualified by 'functional' and 'reactional',
where one could incriminate the failures of the
regulating mechanisms. This concept of 're-
actional ' is still the one we use today.
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF REACTION
It will suffice that the notion of 'traumatism'
renews the image - this time in the psychological
order-of a harmful external intervention for
the idea of reaction to regain all its validity.
There is no lesion that is riot followed by an
effort at recovery - rehabilitating, repairing,
reacting: words linked by the same prefix of
return activity and which are imposed in-
distinctly. When in the word 'abreaction' Freud
and Breuer add a supplementary prefix, they
perfect a scheme of opposition that urges an
imaginary representation, at the same time
dynamic and material.1 While traumatism strikes
the subject from 'without', the abreaction is a
movement that departs from 'within'. If the
word traumatism evokes the image of a wound
caused by a hard object, abreaction is described
so as to make us imagine the 'fluid' substance of
emotion drained towards the outside - liqui-
dated. Thus the pair 'traumatism-abreaction'
1
 Sludien uber Hysterie (1895).
constitutes a pair of notions that are symmetric,
inverse, correlative.
We must go further. The abreaction is not only
defined in relation to traumatism but is defined
as one of the two opposite forms of the response
to traumatism. On the level of reactive behaviour
itself the 'abreaction' is the opposite of 'reten-
tion' (or of 'repression, of the affective stasis).
The opposition between' liquidated' emotion and
' non-liquidated' effect is considered radical: it is
the criterion which allows us to decide between
normal and pathological reaction. Here the
reinforcement of the antonymous function is
considerable. The abreaction is coupled with
'traumatism' which it follows; but at the same
time it represents, for the subject, a 'choice'
opposed to that of 'retention', which generates
hysterical symptoms. Retention is given the
name 'reactional illness' since complete ab-
reaction is the normal process.
Lastly, 'the reactional illness' is defined (a) as a
response to a traumatism, and more generally to
an action exercised from without; (b) as what
prevails in case of failure or insufficiency of the
abreaction. On the lexical level we are here in the
presence of strongly marked 'values' organized
according to a scheme simple enough to impose
itself rapidly and differentiated enough (since
there is double discrimination) to welcome a
subtle casuistry.
Another observation must be made: the clarity
of the scheme we have just set out depends on the
punctual, unique and singularized nature attri-
buted to the traumatism. In order to draw the
paths of reaction in such a precise manner one
must correlatively specify the event that pro-
vokes it and give it an isolated, circumscribed
existence limited in time. Though in return this
event might lose the kind of privilege that makes
it stand out among all experiences, though it may
dissolve and become fluid to include the social
milieu, circumstances, etc., the reaction is no
longer expected to respect the alternative of the
liquidation or the non-liquidation of an emotion.
The more the acceptance given to the instigating
circumstance is extended, the more the list of
possible variants of the reaction will in turn be
extended. This list, as established by Jaspers,2
goes from prison psychosis to nostalgia and
psychoses due to deafness. It is enough for us to
• Jaspers (1948), AUgemeine Psychopatlwlogie, second part,
chap, ii, sect, n, I, pp. 319-327.
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establish a strict temporal relationship between a
provoking circumstance and a reactive state; it is
enough for us to establish a comprehensible
relationship (em verstdndlicher Zusammenhang)
between an experience lived and subsequent
pathological behaviour.
Does not the concept of reaction become too
broad once again ? One might have this fear. But
it retains its operational usefulness in the lan-
guage of psychiatry from the fact that it remains
linked to a system of conceptual oppositions.
It is found mingled in with antonymous pairs,
'endogen/exogen', 'organic/functional', 'soma-
togenic/psychogenic'.1 None the less, we are only
too aware that these pairs of concepts are far
from being interchangeable; they can only be
partially superposed. Reaction is neither a
completely exogenic phenomenon, nor entirely
a functional production. . . The notion of
reaction cannot be reabsorbed in one of the pairs
we have just mentioned. It retains its own
legitimacy in the vocabulary of theory because it
involves still another value of opposition on the
level of the very conception of illness. It is in fact
opposed to a classifying nosology which takes
inventory in a determining way of the genera
morborum, and according to which all patients
virtually bear their diagnosis within them,
from the fact of the precise category of illness
into which they fall. Attention to the individual
experience is required each time for the ever new
response to an ever new situation. Adolf Meyer
was thus able to give the notion of reaction a
polemic and critical value; he hoped to loosen
the hold of the old psychology of faculties,
escape from a pseudo-physiology that fancifully
invoked the 'elements' of psychic life. He
demonstrated the totally arbitrary nature of
compartmentalization imposed by a nosology
that described mental ailments as invariable
essences.2 This happened at the beginning of
our century and this plea for a psychiatry of
reactions itself aroused critical responses.
Once the notion of reaction and reactional
ailment is granted against other etiological
hypotheses, the role of interpretation is still
considerable, and the temptation of antinomies
1
 Cf. Lewis (1971), 'Endogenous' and 'Exogenous': a
useful dichotomy ?
1
 The principal articles of Adolf Meyer have been collected
in Lief (1948), The Commonsense Psychiatry of Dr Adolf
Meyer. See in particular pp. 193-206.
one last time returns to manifest itself with force.
However sincere the desire may be in each case
to determine equitably the share of the subject
and the share of circumstance, it is difficult not
to burden one or the other, to impute to one or
the other a 'fatal error'. At one of the extremes
of interpretation the subject is put on trial: he
'performs' his sickly reaction with all his being.
One can allege his constitutional deficiencies,
one will say he did not know how to dominate
the circumstance, that he has reacted 'in short
circuit', that he has involved himself in an
aberrational 'perlaboration'. At the other ex-
treme the notion of reaction leads to incriminate
the environment, society, even the economic
system to which the subject is unwillingly sub-
mitted. From then on reaction is no longer
interpreted as a loss of mastery but as the
only response possible in an intolerable situa-
tion. (And one does not wonder why, despite
everything, psychotic reactions are so excep-
tional that revolt itself can remain compatible
with the criteria of psychiatric normality.)3
In the psychological sense reaction is lived as
an event; it is the dramatic confrontation of an
individual and a surrounding reality. The link
between the two 'actors' is evident. Now if he
likes, the interpreter can indefinitely play one of
the terms against the other; or, at the very least,
through accusatory thinking, which enjoys
establishing responsibilities, can designate the
guilty. But the task of true criticism is to avoid the
easy satisfactions of accusatory thinking such as
it is notably expressed in the most naive tenden-
cies of contemporary anti-psychiatry. There is
every reason to believe that accusatory thought
is evidence, in those who practice it, of a pro-
pensity to the most summary of reactions. If
knowledge can be considered the extension of
the first human reactions to the stimuli and perils
of the surrounding world, it can be reduced no
further. To know the reaction, to evaluate the
phenomenon in its relation with the word that
designates it, is to no longer be content with the
sole dispensing of reactive energies.4
3
 On the precautions to take in the evaluation of the in-
fluence of determinant factors cf. Cooper & Shepherd (1970),
Life change, stress and mental disorder: the ecological
approach.
4
 This study is the completed and considerably revised
version of what appeared on the same subject in Confronta-
tions psychiatriques (Starobinski, 1974).
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